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Abstract
Over the past decade, all six Gulf Cooper-
ation Council (GCC) states have invested 
considerably in the development of their 
local heritage industries. In parallel, these 
states have expanded their efforts at fos-
tering home-grown nationalism. What 
scholarship exists on the topic of heritage 
production and development in the GCC 
tends to be predominantly anthropolog-
ical, sociological or linked to museum 
studies, while literature on nationalism 
in this context tends to remain in the 
realms of political science. This paper 
addresses existing disciplinary gaps by 
interrogating how heritage interacts with 
nationalism, specifically with state-per-
petuated national narratives about 
citizens’ shared history and common 
identity. The piece draws particular atten-
tion to the state’s key role in mediating 
this process and investigates the extent 
to which non-state actors and grassroots 
initiatives are involved in heritage pro-
duction and national identity formation 
across the Arabian Peninsula.
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Introduction
Over the past decade, as the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have invested 
in increasingly expensive and public heritage projects, a body of scholarly literature has 
emerged on their heritage, yet has largely failed to engage with the parallel emergence of 
more assertive nationalism across these states. Through this paper, we provide a much-
needed analysis and acknowledgement of the power structures operating in the realm 
of heritage production as a means of addressing existing disciplinary gaps in heritage lit-
erature. In so doing, we interrogate how heritage interacts with nationalism, specifically 
through state-perpetuated national narratives about citizens’ shared history and common 
identity; we also raise the question of why the heritage industry has become so important 
to GCC leaderships specifically and how it is used to foster nationalism. Indeed, heri-
tage production is almost exclusively managed by central state authorities in the GCC, 
with limited grassroots initiatives having emerged in recent years. Still, by examining the 
founding myths and dominant tropes that governments propagate through heritage devel-
opments, we can reach a more comprehensive understanding of how GCC states shape 
national identity formation.
This paper is informed by two academic workshops held at LSE as part of a two-year 
project sponsored by the LSE Middle East Centre’s Academic Collaboration with Arab 
Universities Programme, in collaboration with Dr Rima Sabban from Zayed University 
in Dubai, as well as fieldwork conducted in April 2019 in Kuwait and Qatar. Using this 
information, we aim to account for the role of the state in heritage discourse and prac-
tice, which we believe has been neglected in past studies of heritage production and 
preservation in the Arabian Peninsula. In effect, such studies have focused on findings 
from archaeological sites, the role of architecture and material culture more broadly in 
understanding the state’s present through historical developments (dating back to the 
pre-Islamic era in some cases), as well as the notable proliferation of GCC museums, their 
role in heritage revival and shaping heritage discourses, and the dominant place cultural 
planning holds within national frameworks to promote sustainable economic growth and 
tourism development. 
To varying extents, GCC governments have focused on sponsoring a multitude of heritage 
projects that concurrently serve their nation-building efforts and broader economic diver-
sification strategies, including the expansion of their cultural and touristic offerings.1 For 
instance, Qatar’s new national museum, which opened in spring 2019, was commissioned 
at $434 million;2 Dubai’s Museum of the Future cost $136 million,3 and the rehabilitation 
1   Suzi Mirgani, ‘Introduction: Art and Cultural Production in the GCC’, Journal of Arabian Studies vol. 7 
(2017): 1–11.
2   Suzanne Cords, ‘Qatar’s New National Museum: Inspired by the Desert Rose’, DW, 28 March 2019. Avail-
able at https://www.dw.com/en/qatars-new-national-museum-inspired-by-the-desert-rose/a-48093214
3   ‘A Giant, Silver Loop in Dubai Will House the Museum of the Future’, Building Design and Construction, 
5 March 2015. Available at https://www.bdcnetwork.com/giant-silver-loop-dubai-will-house-museum-
future
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of the Kuwait National Museum is estimated at $6 million.4 That so much investment has 
been made into such heritage sites in recent years is informative in itself and indicates a 
broader effort to foster nationalism. In effect, these relatively newly independent states 
have assiduously fostered nationalist sentiment, particularly in recent years. Some have 
gone to war in Yemen, building up concomitant military nationalism,5 while Qatar has 
faced the initial challenges of a blockade by its neighbours by asserting increasing inde-
pendence from the rest of the GCC.6
Kristin Smith Diwan has argued that the nationalist conceptions propagated by GCC lead-
erships are assertive, linked to military prowess, and require service of citizens.7 With the 
implementation of large-scale vision plans meant to spur economic diversification away 
from hydrocarbons, there is greater pressure for citizens to become more active in their 
national economies. As Diwan explains, ‘[t]he rise of the “new nationalism” in the Gulf 
reflects the decline of the power of the welfare state to engender gratitude and loyalty. 
It also reflects the elevated demands by and on citizens: for a framework that allows for 
a more active contribution to public life, and for a better-trained and more enterpris-
ing citizenry.’8 Citizens are expected to become active participants in local economies, 
rather than relying on public sector jobs that have dominated in the past. At the same 
time, however, space for political participation is not expanding in kind.9 Furthermore, the 
4   ‘Patient Restoration: The Kuwait National Museum’, Saudi Aramco World vol, 51, no. 5 (September/
October 2000). Available at https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/200005/patient.restoration-the.
kuwait.national.museum.htm
5   Eleonora Ardemagni, ‘Gulf Monarchies’ Militarized Nationalism’, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 28 February 2019. Available at https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/78472
6   Tim Adams, ‘From Qatar’s Blockade, A Bold Unexpected New Vision is Emerging’, The Guardian, 
6 May 2018. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/06/qatar-blockade-unexpect-
ed-new-vision-isolation
7   Kristin Smith Diwan, ‘Gulf Societies in Transition: National Identity and National Projects in the Arab 
Gulf States: Workshop Report’, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June 2016, p. 12. Available at 
https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/National-Identity_Web-1.pdf
8   Ibid., p. 12.
9   In Bahrain, the opposition was effectively banned from contesting the 2018 parliamentary elec-
tions (Patrick Wintour, ‘Bahrain Election Condemned after Opposition Ban’, The Guardian, 9 
November 2018. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/09/bahrain-undemocrat-
ic-after-ban-placed-on-opposition); in Kuwait, a number of opposition figures were imprisoned in 2017 
for storming parliament in a protest in 2011 (Hussain al-Qatari, ‘Kuwait Sentences Lawmakers to Prison 
over 2011 Protest’, AP News, 8 July 2018. Available at https://apnews.com/3509d3c8ddd74e3e814ce-
15cc154f60a); in Oman, political power remains centralised in the hands of the sultan (Marc Valeri, 
‘Oman’s New Sultan Faces Mammoth Challenges’, BBC News, 21 January 2020. Available at https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51112191); Qatar’s Shura Council elections have been delayed 
(Simone Foxman and Abbas al-Lawati, ‘Qatar Prepares for Legislative Elections after 15-Year Delay’, 
Bloomberg News, 30 October 2019. Available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-31/
qatar-prepares-for-legislative-elections-after-15-year-delay); Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed 
bin Salman is estimated to have imprisoned hundreds for their political beliefs, in addition to jailing 
several members of the ruling family (Michael Safi, ‘Saudi Arabia: Arrests of Dissidents and Torture 
Allegations Continue’, The Guardian, 4 November 2019. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2019/nov/04/saudi-arabia-mass-arrests-of-dissidents-and-torture-allegations-continue); the UAE 
also continues to hold political prisoners and increase domestic surveillance (‘UAE: Political Detain-
8 Whose Story? Narratives of Nationalism in Heritage Production of the Arabian Peninsula
increasing military activity of GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, under-
lines the state’s shift in requiring service of its citizens, and in so doing facilitates the 
emergence of military nationalism, rather than a nationalism linked to traditional heritage 
tropes elaborated upon in this paper. Indeed, since 2014, conscription laws have been 
passed in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and military spending continues to rise across the 
region, demonstrating that the new strand of GCC nationalism is, at least to a certain 
extent, linked to military prowess. The UAE in particular has come to be known as ‘little 
Sparta’10 for its military competence, yet, given the extent to which GCC militaries depend 
on external technology and expertise,11 as well as manpower,12 this does not seem to be a 
main referent for nationalistic tropes. 
Undoubtedly, some aspects of GCC nationalism are shared across the Middle East and 
propagated globally, particularly with regard to the limited inclusion of the military in 
nationalistic tropes. Nonetheless, though this study is focussed on the GCC states, we 
hope to highlight ways in which their state-driven heritage industries differ from those of 
their neighbours. Is the GCC unique in its focus on state-led heritage discourse? And if 
so, why? Do such states provide space for grassroots heritage initiatives to emerge? While 
more substantive research is needed on the topic, this paper draws on visual data and dis-
course analyses of heritage narratives in museum spaces, broader cultural institutions and 
proclaimed heritage sites, as a preliminary step to better grounding analyses of heritage 
developments within their socio-political contexts and particularly within the expansion 
of nationalism in the GCC. The paper outlines the state’s central role in mediating this 
process and incorporating heritage planning as an integral part and driver of the nation-
alist agenda. Through our review of literature, interviews, workshops and fieldwork in 
Kuwait and Qatar in April 2019, we have identified three main characteristics of the GCC 
countries that make them unique areas for the consideration of heritage discourse and 
the creation of heritage tropes: rentierism, tribalism as linked to monarchical rule, and the 
presence of expatriate out-groups. Below, we firstly elaborate on these points and come to 
preliminary conclusions about the consequences of these unique dynamics on the heri-
tage discourse and industry in the GCC. Secondly, we look at the ways in which grassroots 
efforts at heritage production take place in the GCC, as well as the extent to which they 
affirm or subvert the hegemonic nationalist discourses. 
ees Languish behind Bars’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2019. Available at https://www.hrw.org/
news/2019/11/12/uae-political-detainees-languish-behind-bars).
10   Christian H. Heller, ‘Little Sparta’s Big Ambitions: The Emirati Military Comes of Age’, Real Clear 
Defense, 17 September 2019. Available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/09/17/little_
spartas_big_ambitions_the_emirati_military_comes_of_age_114748.html
11   Zoltan Barany, ‘Indigenous Defense Industries in the Gulf ’, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 24 April 2020. Available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/indigenous-defense-industries-gulf
12   Zoltan Barany, ‘Foreign Contract Soldiers in the Gulf ’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 5 February 2020. 
Available at https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/02/05/foreign-contract-soldiers-in-gulf-pub-80979
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Rentierism
One component that has aided the transformation of GCC states into wealthy and asser-
tive states with distinct national identities is the inception of oil wealth. Certainly, states 
of the GCC are distinctive in that practically all of them have access to financial resources 
to support what Nazih Ayubi calls ‘the sources of their religious (or “traditional”) legitimi-
zation with substantial amounts of financial resources.’13 This wealth alone, of course, is 
not sufficient to aid state-building or national identity, something which GCC states have 
increasingly realised and sought to address by financing the heritage industry. Nonethe-
less, this wealth has been cited as having shaped the very character of GCC citizens, with 
reference to a ‘rentier mentality’ often used to explain citizen reliance on public sector 
employment and other aspects of the welfare state in the region.14
Wealthy rentier states of the GCC, despite their ability to provide materially for their citi-
zenry, have increasingly focused on providing a ruling myth and sense of shared national 
identity for them as well. Hootan Shambayati highlights how, under non-rentier condi-
tions, challenges to state authority tend to be economically motivated; due to the fact that 
rentier governments tend to provide handsomely for their citizens; however, moral and 
cultural issues come to the fore as potential challenges to state authority, making state 
involvement (and investment) in this field all the more important.15 Nonetheless, the field 
of literature on rentier state theory largely neglects the importance of culture and heritage 
in states benefitting from natural resource wealth, relying instead on the unique economic 
characteristics of these states to explain their political and social systems. Courtney Freer’s 
work has examined the ways in which rentier governments attempt to co-opt the religious 
sector and independent religious actors in particular, with varying degrees of success,16 but 
this project looks beyond that, to the nationalistic tropes reproduced by heritage sectors 
managed by rentier governments in the Arabian Peninsula, which are often notably secular 
in character. While religion may be referenced, the content of museums we visited tended 
not to be, strictly speaking, religious, with objects in the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha 
often linked to science and technology rather than to religion or religious content itself. 
Owing to the fact that a large portion of GCC economies are reliant on hydrocarbon pro-
duction, it is instructive to see how the discovery of oil is portrayed in national museums, 
if it is touched upon at all. The National Museum of Qatar, for instance, features a large 
display representing the discovery of oil, which ended a particularly dark period of Qatar’s 
history after the decline of the pearl trade in the 1930s due to global recession and the 
introduction of cultured pearls in Japan.17 Oil is therefore openly portrayed as having 
13   Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1993), 118.
14   Hazem Beblawi, ‘The Rentier State in the Arab World’, in Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds), 
The Rentier State (Routledge: London, 1987), 52.
15   Hootan Shambayati, ‘The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and 
Business in Turkey and Iran’, Comparative Politics vol. 26, no. 3 (1994): 307–31.
16   Courtney Freer, ‘State Religious Authorities in Rentier Economies and the Management of Indepen-
dent Islamism’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies vol. 47, no. 1 (2020): 42–61.
17   Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cam-
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saved Qatar from economic disaster. The Company House of Msheireb Museums in 
Doha, which itself is sponsored by hydrocarbon giant Shell, is entirely focused on the start 
of the oil industry and seems to upend the myth that GCC nationals have done little to 
earn their country’s wealth,18 by featuring oral histories from Qatari nationals who worked 
in the oil industry in its early days and recounted the harsh reality of their work. Although 
the oil industries in these states are today primarily staffed by expatriates, they were ini-
tially dependent on local labour.19 The museum traces the discovery of oil and portrays in 
great detail the difficulty of extracting hydrocarbon wealth and the extent to which local 
(male) labourers were a part of this process. As a result, while oil is portrayed as being 
critical to the development of Qatar, it did not do so alone: Qatari labourers were a part of 
this process, thus undermining traditional understandings of the rentier state and rentier 
citizens, which is that, as Beblawi puts it, ‘reward – income or wealth – is not related to 
work and risk bearing, rather to chance or situation.’20 
In Kuwait, whose national museum is currently being renovated, we saw few references 
to the oil industry, perhaps due to the desire to portray its pre-oil past as the ‘authentic’ 
Kuwait. Nonetheless, the dedicated Kuwait Oil Company Ahmed Al-Jaber Oil and Gas 
Exhibition demonstrates ‘ways that oil products help, make our lives better.’21 Oil is thus 
once again portrayed as having saved these states from potentially darker economic fates 
after the decline of the pearling industry. Oman’s Oil and Gas Exhibition Centre, created in 
1995 through funding from Petroleum Development Oman, similarly explores the discov-
ery and extraction of hydrocarbons, as well as their various uses, in that country. In 2012, 
Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Exhibition and Conference (ADIPEC) unveiled the 
UAE’s first oil and gas museum, again chronicling the oil industry in that state.22 Bahrain 
also houses a permanent Dar Al Naft Oil Museum outside of Manama near the original 
Bahrain Petroleum Office. Far from seeking to hide their historical reliance on hydrocar-
bons for their wealth, then, the GCC states tend to have preserved it and even packaged 
it as separate tourist attractions and heritage sites in order to demonstrate the benefits of 
hydrocarbon wealth and the ways in which this wealth was extracted by local labour.
Monarchical Rule and Tribalism
Monarchy, due to the fact that it is based on bloodline, perpetuates both tribal influence 
and the stability of ruling families with tribal linkages; as such, ruling families and these 
countries’ tribal pasts, whether real or imagined, play important roles in heritage sites.23 
bridge University Press, 1990), 38–9.
18   Beblawi, ‘The Rentier State in the Arab World’, 52. 
19   Ibid., 58–9.
20   Ibid., 52.
21   Ahmed Al-Jaber Oil and Gas Exhibition, Kuwait Oil Company. Available at https://www.kocexhibit.
com/#/ 
22   ‘UAE’s First Ever Oil and Gas Museum Attracts Visitors to ADIPEC 2012’, Abu Dhabi City Guide, 
13 November 2012. Available at http://www.abudhabicityguide.com/news/news-details.asp?news-
id=10987&newstype=Company%20News.
23   Lisa Anderson, ‘Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive’, in Joseph Kostiner (ed.), Middle 
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Saudi Arabia is, after all, the only country in the world named after its ruling family – a testa-
ment to the primacy of family in the region, signalling also the predominance of ascriptive 
identity over, for instance, ideological affiliation as is the case in more democratic states.24 
Some scholars have gone so far as to dub the GCC states ‘families with flags’, demonstrat-
ing how central tribalism remains to political and social life in these states.25 Indeed, the 
GCC monarchies have been remarkably effective in constructing modern nation states 
within only decades of their establishment due to their ability to gain central authority 
in the GCC states. In short, ‘[l]ike the regimes of seventeenth-century European absolut-
ists, most of the regimes of the Middle East are centralized, personalistic, and actually or 
potentially coercive. These features are typical of (perhaps even required by) the project 
of state-formation.’26
Nationalism throughout the GCC remains linked to members of ruling families, whose 
photos are ubiquitous in the region. National Days are one important means of empha-
sising the personalistic nature of nationalism inside the GCC monarchies: all have the 
ruling family at their centre.27 Such modes of emphasising monarchical authority help to 
fuse loyalty to the ruling family with loyalty to the state. Going beyond the flagging that 
Michael Billig describes,28 across the GCC, a variety of ‘national’ markers have become 
inextricably linked to the ruling family, making it nearly impossible for a citizen to support 
the state without backing the regime. Indeed, across the UAE, 2018 was commemorated 
as the Year of Zayed, since it marked 100 years since the birth of Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan 
al-Nahyan, the country’s first president and widely considered its founding father. Events 
were held across the emirates through the Higher National Committee for the Year of 
Zayed, demonstrating how institutionalised and how sustained the celebration of the 
former ruler was.29 In a less institutionalised way, the image of Qatari Emir Shaykh Tamim 
bin Hamad al-Thani has become more prominent throughout Qatar after Bahrain, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE cut ties with the country in June 2017; images of the emir remain 
East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 57.
24   Ibid., 58–9.
25   Daniel Martin Varisco, ‘When the State Becomes a Non-State: Yemen between the Huthis, Hiraq and 
Al-Qaeda’, in Peter Sluglett and Victor Kattan (eds), Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The 
Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors (London: IB Tauris, 2019), 145.
26   Anderson, ‘Dynasts and Nationalists’, 55.
27   Saudi Arabia’s national day, for instance, observed on 23 September, commemorates the day on which 
King Abdulaziz pronounced the country as a Kingdom in 1932. Qatar’s national day, on 18 December, 
marks the date on which Jassim bin Mohammed al-Thani became ruler in 1878 and is credited with 
having unified various tribes in the peninsula. Kuwait’s national day, 25 February, marks the date in 1965 
when Shaykh Abdullah became emir. Bahrain’s Nation Day, 16 December, marks the date it declared 
independence, even though it was in fact 15 August, since that date corresponds with the coronation of 
former ruler Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa. Emirati National Day, 2 December, marks the UAE’s indepen-
dence and unification under Shaykh Zayed al-Nahyan. Omani National Day, 18 November, celebrates 
independence from the Portuguese in 1650, while the day following is former leader Sultan Qaboos’ 
birthday, another state holiday.
28   Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: SAGE Publications, 1995), 41.
29   ‘About the Year of Zayed’, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Presidential Affairs. Available at https://
www.zayed.ae/en/year-of-zayed/about/
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a symbol of Qatar’s resilience against external threat, with the image of ‘Tamim al-Majd’, 
drawn by a local artist, having become particularly popular.30 Oman’s Sultan Qaboos, who 
held a variety of positions in the government, was also widely seen as the father of the 
nation, and thus was mourned for 40 days following his death in January 2020, showing 
how widely the figure himself was associated with the state. Further, new forms of media 
allow different means to ‘bring the flag across the contemporary hearth.’31 Ruling family 
members have become increasingly adept at using tools of social media to communicate 
with their citizenry, making them the most visible representatives of the state in daily life 
as well as allowing rulers unofficial means of portraying certain political messages.
The national museum, itself a primary producer and promoter of national heritage, prolif-
erated across the region during the 1970s, financed through the generosity of the region’s 
ruling families. These institutions have sought to put in place singular linear historical 
narratives that form a cohesive whole and in Kuwait and Qatar were placed on the sites of 
rulers’ homes. The objective was the establishment of an Andersonian ‘imagined commu-
nity’ as a means of bringing together the disparate tribal, ethnic, and other sub-national 
identities of the GCC into more distinct national communities, united under the leader-
ship of ruling families. 
Yet it would be erroneous to assume that tribal affiliations and tribal politics are solely rel-
evant to heritage discourses and discussions of the past. Indeed, in the present-day GCC, 
the tribal is ‘not the traditional and certainly not the primitive,’32 but instead ‘is integral 
to the modern; it constitutes a crucial element in the GCC’s modernity.’33 This does not 
mean that it is, as miriam cooke suggests, merely instrumentalised by the state, but rather 
exists on its own as a key marker of social identity and sometimes a political marker as 
well. For example, at National Day celebrations throughout the GCC, tents tend to be 
organised by tribe, demonstrating the importance of such allegiances even at an event 
focussed on national identity. Further, during the protests of 2011, many prominent tribes 
in Bahrain and the UAE publicly voiced their support for ruling families and governments, 
demonstrating the persistent prevalence of subnational identities and their ultimate sub-
servience to national authorities.34
Indeed, the cultural activities that are encouraged inside GCC states are largely managed 
by the government yet tend to affirm tribal identity – something which also confirms 
national belonging and can denote proximity to ruling elites. The creation of ‘cultural’ 
30   Promod Prabhakaran, ‘Meet the Artist behind the Viral Image of Emir’, The Peninsula, 11 June 2017. 
Available at https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/11/06/2017/Meet-the-artist-behind-the-viral-im-
age-of-Emir
31   Billig, 174.
32   miriam cooke, Tribal Modern: Branding New Nations in the Arab Gulf (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2014), 7.
33   Ibid., 9.
34   Justin Gengler, ‘Bahrain Drain: Why the King’s Sunni Supporters are Moving Abroad’, Foreign Affairs, 
5 September 2014. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-09-05/bah-
rain-drain; Rym Ghazal, ‘UAE Tribes Continue to Show Allegiance’, The National, 4 May 2011. Available 
at https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-tribes-continue-to-show-allegiance-1.387952
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or ‘heritage’ cities,35 as well as state support for ‘heritage’ sports like falconry and camel 
racing, highlight the unique pasts of GCC states and underline the fact that the regimes 
remain in control of tribal symbols and tradition. Interestingly, some so-called heritage 
sports, such as camel racing in the UAE, are not historically associated with the region, as 
is pointed out in the work of Sulayman Khalaf.36 Regardless, stories of the (male) members 
of ruling families excelling in such sports serve to underline their aptitude as tribal leaders. 
Museums in these states, namely the Kuwait National Museum, Dubai National Museum, 
and Radwani House in Qatar’s Msheireb Museums highlight tribal life through series of 
dioramas and recreations. In Kuwait, we see more of an emphasis on Kuwait City as a port 
and society’s development within this trade centre entrepôt. Despite such emphasis on 
cosmopolitan pasts, there still remains a disconnect between national and non-national 
populations, who have long played a major role in the commerce-driven societies of the 
Arabian Peninsula.
Expatriates and In-Groups
Imbuing citizens with nationalistic sentiment is particularly encouraged in those GCC 
states where expatriates are the overwhelming majority, especially Qatar and the UAE 
whose citizens are estimated to be only around 10 percent of the total population.37 As 
Ernest Gellner points out, nationalism ‘maintains that similarity of culture is the basic 
social bond.’38 As a result, outward social underpinnings of nationalism are emphasised 
inside the GCC, often through tribal tropes. Indeed, there exists ‘a nationalist-type sen-
sitivity to the impact of foreign residents, who are perceived as diluting local identity.’39 
Expatriates in GCC states are thus often dubbed ‘transplants,’ regardless of how long they 
or their families have lived there. The distinction is read through a focus on the (real or 
imagined) shared tribal past of nationals: the desert was once the home of citizen pop-
ulations and the site of many heritage-linked activities, with this used as justification for 
citizens’ privileged status and claim to the land. 
Tribalism, through emphasising kinship links and thus the authority of ruling families, 
35   Qatar’s Katara Cultural Village was opened in 2011 with the support of former emir, Shaykh Hamad 
bin Khalifa al-Thani; Abu Dhabi’s Heritage Village is another government-sponsored project meant to 
recreate traditional life in the emirate. 
36   Sulayman Khalaf, ‘Poetics and Politics of Newly Invented Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the 
United Arab Emirates’, Ethnology vol. 39, no. 3 (2000): 243–61.
37   As of 2008, the proportion of non-nationals in GCC populations stood at 51 percent in Bahrain, 68 
percent in Kuwait, 31 percent in Oman, 87 percent in Qatar, 27 percent in Saudi Arabia and 81 percent 
in the UAE. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, ‘Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: 
National Patterns and Trends’, LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in 
the Gulf States no. 15 (March 2011): 10. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55239/1/Baldwin-Edwards_2011.
pdf
38   Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), 3.
39   Neil Partrick, ‘Nationalism in the Gulf States’, LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and 
Globalisation in the Gulf States no. 5 (2009): 34. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55257/1/Patrick_2009.
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is a critical component of GCC nationalism. Examining the museum spaces of these 
states, there is very little mention of expatriate populations as part of these cosmopol-
itan entrepôts. Qatar’s Bin Jelmood House seeks to address this issue by documenting 
the history of slavery in the Arabian Peninsula and Indian Ocean and thus approaching 
issues of race, nationality and class in the region. In particular, the museum showcases the 
history of slavery in chronological order and sheds light on the complicity of traders from 
the Arabian Peninsula. The museum also highlights the role Islam played in promoting the 
humane treatment of enslaved people and concludes by outlining the ongoing forms of 
human exploitation, including of migrant workers in the GCC, which must be challenged. 
Because citizenship lines have tended to be drawn according to ethnic background, Ahn 
Nga Longva has dubbed the GCC states ethnocracies: 
the term describes the tendency for an elite to posit their own physical characteristics 
and cultural norms as the essence of the nation over which they rule, thus narrowing 
its definition and excluding all those within the polity who do not exhibit the same 
characteristics or embrace the same norms. In this sense, ethnocracy as a socio-polit-
ical regime is the outcome of ethnonationalism, that brand of nationalism that views 
the nation as a ‘natural’ and ethnically ‘pure’ community, as opposed to its liberal 
conceptualisation as a community based on equal rights and duties.40 
Longva goes on to explain this formulation in Kuwait in particular by examining the lack 
of social and political mobility for non-citizens who are excluded from local political life, 
and largely denied opportunities to enter it.
The work of Neha Vora has also highlighted the ways in which large populations of non-na-
tionals have played critical roles in state-building exercises, yet are excluded from most 
official state histories. As Vora and Koch highlight, ‘what makes nationalist discourse and 
nation-building agendas of the Gulf so powerful is the fact that they have relied heavily 
upon purifying the imagined citizen “self” from the non-citizen “other” – often through 
recuperating the Western Orientalist repertoire.’41 Indeed, as they highlight, heritage sports 
and symbols of primordial culture, like pearling, dhows, windtowers and the desert, as well 
as the use of national dress, demonstrate in daily life the enforced and permanent distinc-
tion between citizens and non-citizens, which in turn shapes how heritage discourses 
are created and maintained.42 Despite the prevalence of state-articulated nationalist and 
heritage discourses, however, there exist some important examples of efforts to up-end 
traditional tropes perpetuated by state authorities – some of which, importantly, include 
the contribution of expatriate populations.
40   Anh Nga Longva, ‘Neither Autocracy nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the 
Socio-Political System in Kuwait’, in Paul Dresch and James Piscatori (eds), Monarchies and Nations: 
Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (London: IB Tauris, 2005), 119.
41   Neha Vora and Natalie Koch, ‘Everyday Inclusions: Rethinking Ethnocracy, Kafala, and Belonging in 
the Arabian Peninsula’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism vol. 15, no. 3 (2015): 548.
42   Ibid., 549.
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State-Enabled Grassroots Initiatives
By largely operating as an extension of the state apparatus, the creative sectors of the GCC 
exercise control over cultural output, which is predominantly moulded to fit the univo-
cal conceptions of national history and identity discussed at greater length above. The 
state’s involvement in this area is important insofar as it is able to decide what heritage 
is and, significantly, what the citizen should look like. Still, there are government-funded 
institutions that demonstrate a commitment to preserving heritage, promoting inclu-
sive cultural activities, and allowing local, independent initiatives to flourish – as long 
as they are state-approved first. For instance, the Sharjah government is notable for its 
efforts to preserve the historic character and architectural legacy of the city, which has 
also helped foster an arguably distinctive identity compared to its neighbouring emirates. 
The UAE’s third largest city and popularly referred to as the cultural capital, Sharjah is 
known for prioritising investments in cultural infrastructure, namely through institutions 
such as the Sharjah Art Foundation (SAF), which not only plays a role in restoring some 
of the city’s historic structures, but also engages local residents in inexpensive, accessible 
activities that allow them to experience local heritage and life in the area. For instance, 
SAF’s community programme, though of course government-run, invites artists and urban 
practitioners to work on various activities for and with local communities in the historic 
neighbourhood, including curated excursions around the area, as well as sketching and 
calligraphy workshops.43 According to the foundation’s website, the ‘SAF neighbourhood 
project reflects, celebrates and documents the narratives of people living and working 
in the area.’44 By using a government initiative, the SAF has managed to cultivate a local 
community with more citizen and non-citizen independent artists, insofar as it enables 
cultural production in a more participatory and socially inclusive way. Still, activities asso-
ciated with the SAF operate within red lines set out by the state and local governments.
Other prominent institutions include Art Dubai (formerly known as the Gulf Art Fair), an 
international art fair established in 2007 by art dealer John Martin and banker Benedict 
Floyd under the patronage of the ruler of Dubai.45 Since its inception, Art Dubai has gained 
international acclaim for its engagement with galleries across the globe. It is prominently 
known as a local talent incubator, comprising different platforms designed to support 
emerging artists and to strengthen the ‘local art ecology’ of the UAE (understood as the 
web of institutions that facilitate cultural production).46 Additionally, Art Dubai is regarded 
as an inclusive institution, insofar as expatriates and residents play an instrumental part in 
the management and curation of its programmes. Nonetheless, because it is managed by 
the state, censorship still exists, and creative freedom is by no means absolute.47
43   Sharjah Art Foundation, 2020. Available at http://sharjahart.org/sharjah-art-foundation/programme/
safneighbourhood 
44   Ibid. 
45   Elaine W. Ng, ‘DIFC Gulf Art Fair’, Art Asia Pacific vol. 53 (May/June 2007). Available at http://arta-
siapacific.com/Magazine/53/DIFCGulfArtFair
46   ‘The Fair’, Art Dubai, 2020. Available at https://www.artdubai.ae/the-fair/
47   Tom Gara, ‘Authorities Censor Art Dubai’, Financial Times, 24 March 2012. Available at https://www.
ft.com/content/1cb7747c-7506-11e1-90d1-00144feab49a; for specific examples, see ‘Censorship Cases at 
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On the topic of state investment in national narratives, some initiatives across the GCC 
depart from hegemonic cultural discourse, by engaging with aspects of collective memory 
that are usually left out of public discussion and official narratives. Established institu-
tions have tried to address alternative discourses that draw attention to migrant identities 
in heritage narratives for instance, although such efforts are still in early stages.48
In Qatar, for example, Msheireb Downtown Doha supported the launch of the Echo 
Memory of Art Project, which sought to document the life of migrant workers who for-
merly lived in the Msheireb area (one of the oldest neighbourhoods of Doha) due to 
Msheireb Properties’ regeneration project in the area.49 This community project was over-
seen by a national government organisation but was artist-led, namely by British curator 
Ben Barbour, Qatari artists, construction workers in the area, as well as employees of 
Msheireb.50 While artefacts were collected and put on display in one of the heritage galler-
ies of the area (the Mohammed Bin Jassim House), the project was more concerned with 
developing a historical record of the neighbourhood than shedding light on the lives and 
identities of the migrant labourers who lived in the area.51 
Therefore, while some of the institutions that are more explicitly part of the state’s cultural 
apparatus provide spaces for engagement with different identities, efforts have been mar-
ginal within the dominant cultural heritage framework. In the case of the Echo Memory of 
Art project, curatorial narratives have been limited in their deconstruction of the singular 
national identity and offer an almost tokenising account by glossing over the migrants 
themselves, and instead focusing on the history of the old neighbourhood. Still, it is an 
important effort to combat rapid development projects in the GCC, or Dubaisation, by 
telling the history of an expatriate-dominated space.
Nonetheless, some grassroots platforms enable further discussions to occur and for greater 
inclusions of citizens and expatriates. For instance, as part of his Hiwar project, Kuwaiti 
multimedia artist, Zahed Sultan, reimagines heritage and culture – particularly the rich yet 
troublesome recollections behind pearl diving music in an effort to counter the glamorised 
and sensationalised accounts that are often represented.52 Hiwar – ‘dialogue’ in Arabic – uses 
live performance to try and portray the essence of pearl diving culture and what it could look, 
sound and feel like had it continued to evolve to this day.53 The project has been successful 
insofar as different age groups have been drawn to the experience, stimulating the curiosity 
of younger generations and sparking in the older a sense of nostalgia. 54 Sultan’s aim is to 
dig deeper and understand the roots of pearl diving culture in a more historically accurate 
Art Dubai’, Art Leaks, 27 March 2012. Available at https://art-leaks.org/2012/03/27/censorship-cases-at-
art-dubai/
48   Sarina Wakefield, ‘Contemporary Art and Migrant Identity “Construction” in the UAE and Qatar’, 
Journal of Arabian Studies vol. 7 (August 2017): 99–111. 
49   Ibid., 104.
50   Ibid.
51   Ibid. 
52   Zahed Sultan, Interview with Yasmine Kherfi, April 2019. More information available at https://www.
zahedsultan.com/
53   Ibid.
54   Ibid.
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way, particularly because the industry was dangerous and exploitative, having propagated a 
series of labour abuses.55 According to the artist, this topic provides a good entry point to not 
only discuss heritage but also the hierarchies of citizenship and domestic worker treatment 
within Kuwaiti society.56 In effect, many pearl divers were slaves, particularly of East-African 
lineage.57 For the most part, this discussion remains taboo, and state-produced information 
disseminates a false sense of identity that ties a nationalistic purity to pearl diving. 58
Other trends include an increase in poetry and spoken word platforms across the GCC 
states – many of which are enabled by residents through social media platforms. For 
instance, the Kuwait Poets Society was established in January 2016 to provide a sup-
portive and collaborative arts space in which poets could meet, present their work and 
socialise.59 The initiative began with a Twitter call-out, and evolved organically through an 
informal collective that coordinated monthly meetings over WhatsApp.60 This initiative, 
like Madeenah, which arranges citizen-curated and grassroots-organised walking tours of 
downtown Kuwait City,61 provides a space for both expatriates and citizens to participate 
on equal footing and to challenge state-propagated narratives. After settling on the name 
Kuwait Poets Society, the initiative became concretised as a broader supportive platform 
not only to facilitate meet ups and collaborative work, but also to draw attention to, and 
create new opportunities for, poetic and musical talent in Kuwait. 62 
The Society’s activities include guided creative writing workshops and feedback sessions 
that offer the space for writers to discuss and get feedback on their latest works, and it 
hosts Open Mic nights that encourage spoken word artists, poets and others to perform, 
as long as the content presented complies with standards deemed fit for the local con-
text.63 This includes avoiding commenting on Kuwaiti politics and government, sharing 
anti-religious or blasphemous views, or expressing explicit sexual content, showing the 
presence of the state’s red lines even in the cultural sphere.64 Nonetheless, the society 
runs a literary magazine entitled Ink & Oil, which promotes literary and artistic talent from 
across the region, and prides itself upon maintaining inclusivity and diversity as high pri-
orities.65 Similar initiatives take place across GCC cities, including Blank Space, an open 
mic night in Dubai.66 Qatar meanwhile has opened the Fire Station: Artist in Residence 
as a means of cultivating artistic talent and providing educational opportunities to local 
55   Ibid.
56   Ibid.
57   Ibid.
58   Ibid.
59   Kuwait Poets Society, 2020. Available at http://kuwaitpoetssociety.com/
60   Ibid.
61   Mai al-Farhan, ‘Madeenah: Exploring Urban Development in Kuwait City’, The Arab Gulf States 
Institute in Washington, 20 March 2017. Available at https://agsiw.org/madeenah-exploring-urban-devel-
opment-kuwait-city/
62   Kuwait Poets Society.
63   Ibid.
64   Ibid.
65   Ibid.
66   Sherouk Zakaria, ‘Blank Space: An Open Mic Event in UAE’, Khaleej Times, 14 September 2016. Avail-
able at https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/blank-space-an-open-mic-event-platform-in-uae
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residents interested in the arts.67 Undoubtedly, then, efforts are being made to shift the 
balance away from state-led heritage and cultural initiatives and to increasingly involve 
local populations; still, these exist within red lines either explicitly enforced or internal-
ised by participants in these projects.
Conclusions
Despite the proliferation of new state-led and independent heritage projects, the role of 
heritage and nation-building initiatives can be seen to reflect and institutionalise, rather 
than redress and overcome, the existing and contested distributions of power in society. 
Heritage projects embody a particular emphasis on ‘Arabian Bedouin desert traditions’ and 
a ‘Bedouin-style cultural past,’ despite the fact that the majority of the country’s nationals 
belong to settled communities, while a large proportion of the national population hail from 
other parts of the world and speak different languages.68 Government-curated heritage sites, 
instead of highlighting cases of difference, tend to focus on creating a singular narrative in 
which tribes have come together, under the leadership of ruling families, to create singu-
lar nation states. Nonetheless, even these government-funded heritage sites appear to be 
changing and becoming more inclusive, at least in some instances, of expatriate populations.
The importance of retaining indigenous cultural peculiarity and promoting nationalism is 
clear through examination of GCC states’ national vision documents, although museum 
megaprojects appear to appeal primarily to international visitors. While the vision documents 
primarily aim to remove existing barriers to economic diversification and target specific 
sectors like tourism in which the government can invest to generate future revenues, as well as 
to build comparative advantage and global competitiveness, they all also note the importance 
of retaining local heritage and values.69 Further, new areas of investment include the creative 
sector, namely the investment in arts and culture, which is not only emphasised in writing, but 
has arguably come to fruition in many cases through the development of specialised clusters 
across different industries, such as the Doha Fire Station and Dubai Design District.70
The UAE Vision 2021, meant to drive forward the state’s diversification, notably also 
promotes the civic responsibility of upholding ‘Emiratis’ solid national character as a 
main source of inspiration for the protection and preservation of national identity’ and 
describes the latter as a ‘crucial matter of national pride and social stability (…) in the 
face of increasing multiculturalism.’71 Qatar National Vision 2030 also includes a range of 
future objectives for the country, including the development of an education system that 
roots Qatari youth in ‘Qatari moral and ethical values, traditions and cultural heritage.’72 
Bahrain’s Economic Vision 2030 similarly emphasises the need to ensure that economic 
growth does not come at the expense of preserving Bahraini cultural heritage, a common 
67   ‘Fire Station: Artist in Residence’. Available at http://firestation.org.qa/en/about
68   Partrick, ‘Nationalism in the Gulf States’, 16–17.
69   Martin Hvidt, ‘Planning for Development in the GCC States: A Content Analysis of Current Develop-
ment Plans’, Journal of Arabian Studies vol. 2, no. 2 (2012): 189–207.
70   Ibid.
71   UAE Vision 2021. Available at https://www.vision2021.ae/docs/default-source/default-document-li-
brary/uae_vision-arabic.pdf?sfvrsn=b09a06a6_6
72   Qatar National Vision 2030. Available at https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/
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concern throughout the GCC, and outlines the need to ‘encourage new generations of 
Bahrainis to gain experience and in-depth knowledge of their cultural heritage.’73 Kuwait’s 
Vision 2035 includes the project ‘Preservation and Promotion of Kuwait’s Cultural Heri-
tage’ under the leadership of UNESCO, UNDP, the National Council for Culture Arts and 
the Supreme Council for Planning and Development; it intends to ‘conserve, promote, 
and modernize the current cultural infrastructure in Kuwait.’74 Such vision documents, 
while initially presented as economic reform plans, also highlight the significance of pre-
serving material cultural heritage and less tangible national cultural values as critically 
important to the future of these states.
Clearly, the GCC states provide unique sites for the study of heritage discourse and pro-
duction due to the presence of rentierism, tribalism and monarchy, and large expatriate 
populations, and are certainly worthy of further investigation. Existing literature on the 
topic has neglected to focus on the ways in which heritage messaging is inherently polit-
ical by examining in particular the three unique components of GCC heritage sectors, as 
discussed above. Where rentier state theory largely ignores the role of nationalism or her-
itage, scholarship oriented towards museum studies largely excludes the role of the state. 
We see this paper as a step toward redressing that balance, while keeping in mind ways in 
which the GCC states are each distinctive as sites of heritage production, and worthy of 
comparison with other countries in the broader Middle East.
Lastly, it is important to examine state-promoted heritage discourse and projects to 
understand the significance of curatorial and narrative choices, such as the decision to 
highlight particular national figures and events based on hegemonic perceptions of their 
historical value.75 It is equally relevant to keep in mind that, regardless of context within or 
outside of rentier states and the Arabian Peninsula, an inevitable process of editing takes 
place to create cohesive national narratives and values, all of which contribute to a sin-
gular cultural heritage associated with the state.76 Governments of GCC states, uniquely 
positioned to invest considerable resources and attention to reforming cultural heritage 
discourse, therefore inevitably take an active political role in managing the demands of 
both state-sponsored and grassroots narratives. 
Despite the demands of government-led heritage projects and vision documents, an 
increasingly vibrant local scene engaging with cultural and heritage production is now 
emerging, albeit within government red lines. While government institutions across the 
GCC may use their substantial funds to promote univocal conceptions of their national 
history and identity, we see some democratisation of access to cultural production and 
efforts to include grassroots and expatriate voices in both state-led heritage discourse and 
discussions at the grassroots level.
73   The Economic Vision 2030 for Bahrain. Available at https://www.moic.gov.bh/en/Ministry/Docu-
ments/Vision%202030.pdf
74   ‘Final Evaluation of the Project “Preservation and Promotion of Kuwait’s Cultural Heritage”’, 
UNDP, 2020. Available at https://www.openigo.com/vacancies/final-evaluation-of-the-project- 
preservation-and-promotion-of-kuwaits-cultural-heritage/
75   Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1995), 14–30.
76   Ibid.
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